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This is the summary of the paper titled “Flipping Bits in Memory Without Accessing Them: An Experimental
Study of DRAM Disturbance Errors” which appeared in ISCA in June 2014 [21].
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I. RowHammer: A New DRAM Failure
Mode
As process technology scales down to smaller dimen-
sions, DRAM chips become more vulnerable to distur-
bance, a phenomenon in which different DRAM cells in-
terfere with each other’s operation. For the first time in
academic literature, our ISCA paper [21] exposes the ex-
istence of disturbance errors in commodity DRAM chips
that are sold and used today. We show that repeat-
edly reading from the same address could corrupt data
in nearby addresses. More specifically:
When a DRAM row is opened (i.e., activated)
and closed (i.e., precharged) repeatedly (i.e.,
hammered), it can induce disturbance errors in
adjacent DRAM rows.
This failure mode is popularly called RowHammer.
We tested 129 DRAM modules manufactured within the
past six years (2008–2014) and found 110 of them to
exhibit RowHammer disturbance errors, the earliest of
which dates back to 2010. In particular, allmodules from
the past two years (2012–2013) were vulnerable, which
implies that the errors are a recent phenomenon affecting
more advanced generations of process technology. Im-
portantly, disturbance errors pose an easily-exploitable
security threat since they are a breach of memory protec-
tion, wherein accesses to one page (mapped to one row)
modifies the data stored in another page (mapped to an
adjacent row).
Our ISCA paper [21] makes the following contribu-
tions.
1. We demonstrate the existence of DRAM distur-
bance errors on real DRAM devices from three ma-
jor manufacturers and real systems using such devices
(using a simple piece of user-level assembly code).
2. We characterize in detail the characteristics and
symptoms of DRAM disturbance errors using an
FPGA-based DRAM testing platform.
3. We propose and explore various soluions to prevent
DRAM disturbance errors. We develop a novel, low-
cost system-level approach as a viable solution to the
RowHammer problem.
1.1. Demonstration of the RowHammer
Problem
Code 1a is a short piece of assembly code that we
constructed to induce DRAM disturbance errors on real
systems. It is designed to generate a read to DRAM on
every data access. First, the two mov instructions read
from DRAM at address X and Y and install the data into
a register and also the cache. Second, the two clflush
instructions evict the data that was just installed into
the cache. Third, the mfence instruction ensures that
the data is fully flushed before any subsequent memory
instruction is executed. Finally, the code jumps back to
the first instruction for another iteration of reading from
DRAM.
On processors employing out-of-order execution,
Code 1a generates multiple read requests, all of which
queue up in the memory controller before they are sent
out to DRAM: reqX, reqY, reqX, reqY, · · · . Importantly,
we chose the values of X and Y so that they map to dif-
ferent rows within the same bank. This is so that the
memory controller is forced to open and close the two
rows repeatedly: ACTX, RDX, PREX, ACTY, RDY, PREY, · · · .
Using the address-pair (X, Y), we then executed Code 1a
for millions of iterations. Subsequently, we repeated this
procedure using many different address-pairs until every
row in the DRAM module was opened/closed millions
of times. In the end, we observed that Code 1a caused
many bits to flip. For four different processors, Table 1
reports the total number of bit-flips induced by Code 1a
for two different initial states of the module: all ‘0’s or all
‘1’s. Since Code 1a does not write any data into DRAM,
we conclude that the bit-flips are the manifestation of
disturbance errors caused by repeated reading (i.e., ham-
mering) of each memory row. In the next section, we will
show that this particular DRAM module yields millions
of errors in a more controlled environment.
1 code1a:
2 mov (X), %eax
3 mov (Y), %ebx
4 clflush (X)
5 clflush (Y)
6 mfence
7 jmp code1a
a. Induces errors
1 code1b:
2 mov (X), %eax
3 clflush (X)
4
5
6 mfence
7 jmp code1b
b. Does not induce errors
Code 1. Assembly code executed on Intel/AMD ma-
chines
Bit-Flip Intel Intel Intel AMDSandy Bridge Ivy Bridge Haswell Piledriver
‘0’  ‘1’ 7,992 10,273 11,404 47
‘1’  ‘0’ 8,125 10,449 11,467 12
Table 1. Bit-flips induced by disturbance on a 2GB
module
As a control experiment, we also ran Code 1b which
reads from only a single address. Code 1b did not
induce any disturbance errors as we expected. For
Code 1b, all of its reads are to the same row in
DRAM: reqX, reqX, reqX, · · · . In this case, the mem-
ory controller minimizes the number of DRAM com-
mands [39, 44, 35, 36, 24, 23, 4, 42, 43] by opening and
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closing the row just once, while issuing many column
reads in between: ACTX, RDX, RDX, RDX, · · · , PREX. From
this we conclude that DRAM disturbance errors are in-
deed caused by the repeated opening/closing of a row,
and not by the reads themselves.
1.2. Characterization of the RowHammer
Problem
To develop an understanding of disturbance errors,
we characterize 129 DRAM modules on an FPGA-based
DRAM testing platform [16, 26, 20, 21, 38]. Unlike a
general-purpose processor, our testing platform grants
us precise and fine-grained control over how and when
DRAM is accessed on a cycle-by-cycle basis. To char-
acterize a module, we test each one of its rows one by
one. First, we initialize the entire module with a known
data-pattern. Second, we activate one particular row as
quickly as possible (once every 55ns) for the full dura-
tion of a refresh interval (64ms). Third, we read out the
entire module and search for any changes to the data-
pattern. We then repeat the three steps for every row in
the module.
Key Findings. In the following, we summarize four
of the most important findings of our RowHammer char-
acterization study.
1. Errors are widespread. Figure 1 plots the normal-
ized number of errors for each of the 129 modules as a
function of their manufacture date. Our modules are
sourced from three major DRAM manufacturers whose
identities have been anonymized to A, B, and C. From
the figure, we see that disturbance errors first started to
appear in 2010, and that they afflict all modules from
2012 and 2013. In particular, for each manufacturer, the
number of errors per 109 cells can reach up to 5.9× 105,
1.5 × 105, and 1.9 × 104, respectively. To put this into
perspective, there can be as many as 10 million errors in
a 2GB module.
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Figure 1. Normalized number of errors vs. manufacture
date
2. Errors are symptoms of charge loss. For a given
DRAM cell, we observed that it experiences data loss in
only a single direction: either ‘1’‘0’ or ‘0’‘1’, but not
both. This is due to an intrinsic property of DRAM cells
called orientation. Depending on the implementation,
some cells represent a data value of ‘1’ using the charged
state, while other cells do so using the discharged state
— these cells are referred to as true-cells and anti-cells,
respectively [28]. We profiled several modules for the
orientation of their cells, and discovered that true-cells
experience only ‘1’‘0’ errors and that anti-cells expe-
rience only ‘0’‘1’ errors. From this, we conclude that
disturbance errors occur as a result of charge loss.
3. Errors occur in adjacent rows. We verified that
the disturbance errors caused by activating a row are lo-
calized to two of its immediately adjacent rows. There
could be three possible ways in which a row interacts
with its neighbors to induce their charge loss: (i) elec-
tromagnetic coupling, (ii) conductive bridges, and (iii)
hot-carrier injection. We confirmed with at least one
major DRAM manufacturer that these three phenom-
ena are potential causes of the errors. Section 3 of our
ISCA paper [21] provides more analysis.
4. Errors are access-pattern dependent. For a cell
to experience a disturbance error, it must lose enough
charge before the next time it is replenished with charge
(i.e., refreshed). Hence, the more frequently we refresh
a module, the more we counteract the effects of distur-
bance, which decreases the number of errors. On the
other hand, the more frequently we activate a row, the
more we strengthen the effects of disturbance, which in-
creases the number of errors. We experimentally val-
idated this trend by sweeping the refresh interval and
the activation interval between 10–128ms and 55–500ns,
respectively. In particular, we observed that no errors
are induced if the refresh interval is ≤8ms or if the ac-
tivation interval is ≥500ns. Importantly, we found that
it takes as few as 139K activations to a row before it
induces disturbance errors.
Other Findings. Our ISCA paper provides an ex-
tensive set of characterization results, some of which we
list below.
• RowHammer errors are repeatable. Across ten itera-
tions of tests, >70% of the erroneous cells had errors
in every iteration.
• Errors are not strongly affected by temperature. The
numbers of errors at 30◦C, 50◦C, and 70◦C differ by
<15%.
• There is almost no overlap between erroneous cells
and weak cells (i.e., cells that are inherently the leaki-
est and thus require a higher refresh rate).
• Simple ECC (e.g., SECDED) cannot prevent all
RowHammer-induced errors. There are as many as
four errors in a single cache-line.
• Errors are data-pattern dependent. The Solid data-
pattern (all ‘0’s or all ‘1’s) yields the fewest errors,
whereas the RowStripe data-pattern (alternating rows
of ‘0’s and ‘1’s) yields the most errors.
• A very small fraction of cells experience an error when
either one of their adjacent rows is repeatedly acti-
vated.
1.3. Prevention of the RowHammer Problem
In our ISCA paper, we examine a total of seven so-
lutions to tolerate, prevent, or mitigate DRAM distur-
2
bance errors. The first six solutions are: 1) making bet-
ter DRAM chips, 2) using error correcting codes (ECC),
3) increasing the refresh rate, 4) remapping error-prone
cells after manufacturing, 5) remapping/retiring error-
prone cells at the user level during operation, 6) iden-
tifying hammered rows and refreshing their neighbors.
None of these frst six solutions are very desirable as they
come at various significant power, performance or cost
overheads.
Our main proposal to solve the RowHammer problem
is a novel low-overhead mechanism called PARA (proba-
bilistic adjacent row activation). The key idea of PARA
is simple: every time a row is opened and closed, one
of its adjacent rows is also opened (i.e., refreshed) with
some low probability. If one particular row happens to
be opened and closed repeatedly, then it is statistically
certain that the row’s adjacent rows will eventually be
opened as well. The main advantage of PARA is that
it is stateless. PARA does not require expensive hard-
ware data-structures to count the number of times that
rows have been opened or to store the addresses of the
error-prone cells. PARA can be implemented either in
the memory controller or the DRAM chip (internally).
PARA is implemented as follows. Whenever a row is
closed, the PARA control logic flips a biased coin with
a probability p of turning up heads, where p  1. If
the coin turns up heads, the controller opens one of
the adjacent rows where either of them is chosen with
equal probability (p/2). The parameter p can be set so
that disturbance errors occur at an extremely low rate —
many orders of magnitude lower than the failure rates of
other system components (e.g., hard-disk). In fact, even
under the most adversarial conditions, PARA’s failure
rate is only 9.4× 10−14 errors-per-year when p is set to
just 0.001. Due to the extra activations, PARA incurs
a small performance overhead (slowdown of 0.20% av-
eraged across 29 benchmarks), which we believe to be
justified by the (i) strong reliability guarantee and (ii)
low design complexity resulting from PARA’s stateless
nature. More detailed analysis can be found in our ISCA
2014 paper [21].
II. Significance
Our ISCA paper [21] identifies a new reliability prob-
lem and a security vulnerability, RowHammer, that af-
fects an entire generation of computing systems being
used today. We build a comprehensive understanding of
the problem based on a wealth of empirical data we ob-
tain from more than 120 DRAMmemory modules. After
examining various ways of addressing the problem, we
propose a low-overhead solution that provides a strong
reliability (and, hopefully, security) guarantee.
Exposition. For the first time in academic literature,
we expose the widespread vulnerability of commodity
DRAM chips to disturbance (aka, RowHammer) errors.
After testing a large sample population of DRAM mod-
ules (the oldest of which dates back to 2008), we deter-
mine that the problem first arose in 2010 and that it still
persists to this day. We found modules from all three ma-
jor manufacturers, as well as in all modules assembled
between 2012–2013, are vulnerable to the RowHammer
problem.
Demonstration. We demonstrate that disturbance
errors are an actual hardware vulnerability affecting real
systems. We construct a user-level kernel which in-
duces many errors on general-purpose processors from
Intel (Sandy Bridge, Ivy Bridge, Haswell) and AMD
(Piledriver). With its ability to bypass memory pro-
tection (OS/VMM), the kernel can be deployed as a dis-
turbance attack to corrupt the memory state of a system
and its software. We discuss the possibility, for the first
time, that this RowHammer problem can be developed
into a malicious “disturbance attack” (Section 4 of our
ISCA paper [21]).1
Characterization. We characterize the cause and
symptoms of disturbance errors based on a large-scale
study, involving 129 DRAM modules (972 DRAM chips)
sampled from a time span of six years. We extensively
test the modules using a custom-built FPGA infrastruc-
ture [16, 26, 28, 21, 38] to determine the specific condi-
tions under which the errors occur, as well as the specific
manner in which they occur. From this, we build a com-
prehensive understanding of disturbance errors.
Solution. We propose seven categories of solutions
that could potentially be employed to prevent distur-
bance errors. Among them, our main proposal is called
PARA (probabilistic adjacent row activation), whose ma-
jor advantage lies in its stateless nature. PARA elimi-
nates the need for hardware counters to track the num-
ber of activations to different rows (proposed in other
potential solutions [5, 6, 7, 8, 11, 12, 18]), while still be-
ing able to refresh the at-risk rows in a timely manner.
Based on our analysis, we establish that PARA provides
a strong reliability guarantee even under the worst-case
conditions, proving it to be an effective and efficient so-
lution against the RowHammer problem.
2.1. Long-Term Impact
We believe our ISCA paper will affect industrial and
academic research and development for the following
four reasons. First, it exposes a real and pressing man-
ifestation of the difficulties in DRAM scaling — a crit-
ical problem which is expected to become only worse
in the future [33, 37, 34]. Second, it breaks the con-
ventional wisdom of memory protection, demonstrating
that the system-software (OS/VMM) — just by itself
— cannot isolate the address space of one process (or
virtual machine) from that of another, thereby exposing
the vulnerability of systems, for the first time, to what
we call DRAM disturbance attacks, or RowHammer at-
tacks. Third, it builds the necessary experimental infras-
tructure to seize full control over DRAM chips, thereby
unlocking a whole new class of characterization studies
and quantitative data. Fourth, it emphasizes the im-
portant role of computer architects to examine holistic
approaches for improving system-level reliability and se-
curity mechanisms for modern memory devices — even
when the underlying hardware is unreliable.
1Recent works [40, 13] that build upon our ISCA 2014 paper
actually demonstrate that a user can take over an entire system and
gain kernel privilges by intelligently exploiting the RowHammer
problem.
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Empirical Evidence of Challenges in DRAM
Technology Scaling. DRAM process scaling is becom-
ing more difficult due to increased cost and complexity,
as well as degraded reliability [9, 14, 15, 33, 37, 34]. This
explains why disturbance errors are found in all three
DRAM manufacturers, in addition to why their first ap-
pearances coincide with each other during the same time-
frame (2010–2011). As process scaling continues onward,
we could be faced with a new and diverse array of DRAM
failures, some of which may be diagnosed only after they
have been released into the wild — as was the case with
disturbance errors of today. In this context, our paper
raises awareness about the next generation of DRAM
failures that could undermine system integrity. We ex-
pect, based on our experimental evidence of DRAM er-
rors, that future DRAM chips could suffer from similar
or other vulnerabilities.
RowHammer Security Implications: Threats of
Unreliable Memory. Virtual machines and virtual
memory protection mechanisms exist to provide an iso-
lated execution environment that is safeguarded from
external tampering or snooping. However, in the pres-
ence of disturbance errors (or other hardware faults), it
is possible for one virtual machine (or application) to
corrupt the memory of another virtual machine (or ap-
plication) that is housed in the same physical machine.
This has serious implications for modern systems (from
mobile systems to data centers), where multiprogram-
ming is common and many virtual machines (or appli-
cations) potentially from different users are consolidated
onto the same physical machine. As long as there is shar-
ing between any two pieces of software, our paper shows
that strong isolation guarantees between them cannot be
provided unless all levels of the system stack are secured.
As a result, malicious software can be written to take
advantage of these disturbance errors. We call these dis-
turbance attacks, or RowHammer attacks. Such attacks
can be used to corrupt system memory, crash a system,
or take over the entire system. Confirming the predic-
tions of our ISCA paper [21], researchers from Google
Project Zero recently developed a user-level attack that
exploits disturbance errors to take over an entire sys-
tem [40]. More recently, researchers have shown that
the RowHammer can be exploited remotely via the use
of JavaScript [13]. As such, the new problem exposed by
our ISCA 2014 paper, the DRAM RowHammer prob-
lem, has widespread and profound real implications on
system security, threatening the foundations of memory
security on top of which modern systems are built.
DRAM Testing Infrastructure. Our paper builds
a powerful infrastructure for testing DRAM chips. It was
designed to grant the user with software-based control
over the precise timing and the exact data with which
DRAM is accessed. This creates new opportunities for
DRAM research in ways that were not possible before.
For example, we have already leveraged the infrastruc-
ture for (i) characterizing different modes of retention
failures [17, 28] and (ii) characterizing the safety margin
in timing parameters to operate DRAM at lower laten-
cies than what is recommended [26]. In the future, we
plan to open-source the infrastructure for the benefit of
other researchers.
System-Level Approach to Enable DRAM Scal-
ing. Unlike most other known DRAM failures, which
are relatively easily caught by the manufacturers, dis-
turbance errors require an extremely large number of
accesses before they are sensitized — a full-coverage
test to reveal all disturbance errors could take days or
weeks. As DRAM cells become even smaller and less re-
liable, it is likely for them to become even more vulner-
able to complicated and different modes of failure which
are sensitized only under specific access-patterns and/or
data-patterns. As a scalable solution for the future, our
paper argues for adopting a system-level approach [33]
to DRAM reliability and security, in which the DRAM
chips, the memory controller, and the operating system
collaborate together to diagnose/treat emerging DRAM
failure modes.
III. Conclusion
Our ISCA 2014 paper [21] is the first work that ex-
poses, demonstrates, characterizes, and prevents a new
type of DRAM failure, the DRAM RowHammer prob-
lem, which can cause serious security and reliability
problems. As DRAM process technology scales down
to even smaller feature sizes, we hope that our findings
will inspire the research community to develop innova-
tive approaches to enhance system-level reliability and
security by focusing on such new forms of memory errors
and their implications for modern computing systems.
IV. More Information
For more information, we point the reader to the fol-
lowing resources:
1. We have released source code to induce DRAM
RowHammer errors as open source software [3].
2. We have released presentations on the RowHammer
problem [32, 19].
3. We have written various papers describing chal-
lenges in DRAM scaling and memory systems in gen-
eral [33, 37, 34].
4. Building upon our observations, others have ex-
ploited the RowHammer problem to take over modern
systems and have released their source code [40, 13].
5. Mark Seaborn maintains a discussion group [1] that
discusses RowHammer issues.
6. More detailed background information and discus-
sion on DRAM can be found in our video lectures [30, 31]
or recent works that explains the operation and architec-
ture of modern DRAM chips [29, 25, 27, 26, 16, 28, 10,
41, 22].
7. Twitter has a record of popular discussions on the
RowHammer problem [2].
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